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Abstract 
Although there is a growing body of research exploring 
the transition to a more service-based orientation in 
complex product markets, the majority of this 
literature adopts what mighty be classified as a 
‘manufacturer-active’ point of view; that is it 
explores the challenges faced by firms (e.g. aircraft 
and capital equipment manufacturers, building firms, 
etc.) seeking to ‘sell’ their re-conceptualized streams 
of revenue. There has been much less research exploring 
the challenges associated with the transition from 
traditional asset acquisition processes to ‘buying’ or 
procuring complex performance (PCP) – here defined as a 
combination of transactional and infrastructural 
complexity. This paper explores the macro and micro-
economic context to this specific problem space and 
develops a preliminary conceptualisation of the process 
of PCP. It draws on two principle literatures: one 
focused on the boundary conditions firms consider when 
choosing to ‘make or buy’ a range of different 
activities from the market (e.g. Fine and Whitney, 
1999; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Williamson, 1985; 
Grover and Malhotra, 2003) and, the other on public 
procurement (e.g. Thai and Piga, 2006; Knight et al., 
2007) and Public-Private Partnerships in particular 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Froud, 2003). Three 
distinct governance challenges are presented: (1) 
contractual, (2) relational and (3) integration. The 
paper explores the implications of the conceptual model 
by developing a range of research propositions that are 
intended to be the foundations for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
Buying the performance outcomes of a resource-in-use, 
rather than acquiring the resource and using it, is not 
a novel phenomenon: from the laundry where a customer 
purchases ‘cleaned clothes’ to the vehicle-leasing firm 
where a client contracts for ‘miles travelled’. Today 
however, this approach is being increasingly applied to 
the procurement of complex performance: DuPont for 
instance, after years of outsourcing non-core services, 
awarded a long-term contract to Convergys to redesign 
and deliver the various HRM programs for its 60,000 
employees in 70 countries (Engardio et al., 2006). 
Likewise, in the computing and telecommunications 
sectors for example, the volume of outsourced R&D and 
manufacturing services is forecast to grow to almost 
$350 billion by 2009 (Carbone, 2005). Similarly firms 
like Infosys are developing and maintaining a range of 
mission critical IT applications for numerous 
international financial institutions. The same trend is 
evident in public procurement: UK government for 
example has long commissioned specific research 
projects from universities and private-sector 
institutions but in recent years more and more complex 
research performance is being outsourced and contracted 
for: for instance, Serco has managed the national 
standards laboratory, a large scale, internationally 
respected centre of excellence in measurement and 
materials science R&D, since 1995.  
Interestingly, although there is a growing body of 
research exploring different aspects of this transition 
to a more complex service-based orientation (Potts, 
1988; Armistead and Clark, 1992; Mathe and Shapiro, 
1993; Miller et al., 1995; Hobday, 1998; Gadiesh and 
Gilbert, 1998; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Kumaraswamy 
and Zhang, 2001; Mathieu 2001a, 2001b; Brady et al., 
2005; Davies et al., 2007), the majority of this 
literature adopts a ‘provider-active’ point of view; 
  
that is it explores the challenges faced by firms (e.g. 
aircraft and capital equipment manufacturers, building 
firms, etc.) seeking to ‘sell’ their re-conceptualized 
streams of revenue. There has been much less research 
on the challenges associated with the transition from 
traditional asset acquisition processes to ‘buying’ 
complex performance (e.g. Lindberg and Nordin 2008, van 
der Valk 2008). This represents a significant empirical 
and theoretical research opportunity because it is a 
global phenomenon that necessitates understanding of 
the factors that influence both private and public-
sector organisational scale and scope. This exploratory 
paper comprises two main sections. The first introduces 
the content of, and context to, the research – offering 
a model of performance complexity. In the second, the 
additive process of procuring complex performance (PCP) 
problem space is presented as a series of three 
governance challenges: contractual, relational and, 
integration. The implications of the conceptualization 
are discussed in a range of propositions that can be 
viewed as foundations for subsequent research in this 
increasingly significant area of public and private 
sector procurement. 
 
2. The Content and Context of PCP 
Consider the provision of aero-engine ‘power by the 
hour’. Although inter- and intra-organisational 
boundaries have clearly been changed, the intrinsic 
complexities of aero-engine supply and support have not 
been removed by this procurement arrangement: these 
sophisticated capital assets still need to be paid for 
(depreciated) and supported, often globally, by a 
Maintenance-Repair-Overhaul (MRO) organisation, with 
the support of a range of external contractors. 
Moreover, although an apparently simple procurement 
arrangement, with airlines specifying x hours of flying 
time, closer consideration reveals a whole range of 
  
likely buyer conditions (e.g. short versus long haul, 
timing and location of maintenance operations) and 
provider caveats (e.g. provider contract assumes the 
engine doesn’t exceed certain operating parameters, 
etc.) in any contract. In sum, this is a good example 
of what the paper means by complex performance outcomes 
and the additive challenge of PCP. ‘Power by the hour’ 
as an outcome actually means on-wing aero-engines 
operating within efficient and effective boundaries – 
this is complex performance. Buying this kind of 
outcome means that airlines have to make significant 
judgements about reconfigured sets of specialized and 
complex input capabilities – this is PCP. 
This archetype provides a useful point of departure for 
this conversation but in order to build a conceptually 
robust picture of PCP it is necessary to bound the 
distinct phenomenon before moving on to explore why and 
how organisations embark on the PCP process. 
 
2.1. What is PCP? 
Noting that any complexity construct is relative, 
subjective and a function of the level of analysis 
applied, the relevant literature highlights two 
dimensions of performance complexity that have 
particular relevance to subsequent procurement 
decisions. 
The first relates to the performance complexity itself 
(Danaher and Mattsson, 1998), a function of 
characteristics such as the level of knowledge embedded 
in the performance (e.g. the ability to type up doctors 
notes compared with the ability to read an X-Ray chart) 
and/or the level of customer interaction (e.g. scripted 
‘performances’ compared with ‘performances’ that are  
“…empathetic and facile with respect to language and 
culture”: Youngdahl and Ramaswamy, 2007). Knowledge-
intensive and highly interactive services like 
management consultancy have traditionally presented a 
  
significant challenge for procurement processes because 
they are difficult to specify ex-ante and, 
correspondingly, difficult to measure and monitor. 
Unsurprisingly, this has often meant that they are a 
controversial area of public and private expenditure. 
Second, there is the complexity of the infrastructure 
through which performance is enacted. This complexity 
can be largely characterized by the extent to which it 
is “bespoke or highly customized” (Brady et al., 2005). 
Infrastructure procurement is often irregular and, as a 
result, buyers often rely heavily on specialist 
suppliers, indeed increasingly firms “know less than 
they buy” especially in the light of recent outsourcing 
trends (Davies, 2003). Figure 1 combines these 
dimensions into a matrix of total procurement 
complexity. 
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Figure 1. The Procurement Complexity Space 
 
The top-right quadrant of the matrix, labeled category 
IV, represents the highest level of aggregate 
complexity and provides the preliminary definition of 
PCP. 
 
Procuring Complex Performance is defined by inter-
organizational arrangements that are characterized by 
significant levels of performance complexity (i.e. must 
include numerous knowledge intensive activities) and 
  
infrastructural complexity (i.e. must include 
substantial bespoke or highly customized hardware and 
software elements). 
 
Although further work will be needed to operationalize 
the two framing dimensions (and thereby generate 
empirical tests for the typology and its boundaries) in 
this preliminary work it is possible to further detail 
the other categories in order to reinforce the 
differential characteristics of Category IV. 
 
Table 1 below summarizes each category and provides 
illustrative examples. 
 
Category Example 
I Domestic waste collection service. Here, a public 
authority (e.g. Minneapolis, one of the first US cities 
to introduce competition in refuse collection) procures a 
service with a simple specification and stable demand 
patterns (low performance complexity); based on well-
known technologies operating in a fixed area (low 
infrastructural complexity) 
II Management consultancy services, in particular ‘grey 
matter’ assignments such as senior-level policy guidance 
(Maister, 1995), are a good example of high performance 
complexity (i.e. knowledge intensive and strongly client 
relationship/interaction driven) and low infrastructural 
complexity. 
III An off-shored IT support service with a call centre where 
customer interactions are limited in scope and carefully 
scripted (i.e. low performance complexity) is delivered 
via a relatively sophisticated and complex technological 
infrastructure. 
IV The UK governments’ (long delayed and expensive) 
replacement of its airborne surveillance and counter-
measures aircraft (Nimrod/MRA4) for instance. The prime 
contractor, BAe Systems, won the contract to develop and 
manufacture a small batch of technologically advanced 
aircraft (albeit based on a very old airframe) and 
provide their supporting operational and training 
infrastructure together with various second line training 
and maintenance services (high infrastructural 
  
complexity); all procured under an availability contract 
that provided for different levels of mission hours under 
different operating conditions, etc. (high performance 
complexity). 
 
Table 1. Different Categories of Performance Complexity 
 
Additionally, it would be interesting to explore how 
these types of complexity interact and modify over 
time. For instance, international engineering firms 
like Arup and Atkins use off-shoring strategies to 
manage knowledge and information (transactional 
complexity) through the life cycles of their own 
complex infrastructure provision, suggesting that 
simplification and complexity segmentation strategies 
will form an important part of any PCP arrangement. 
Equally, competitive, technological, regulatory and 
legislative forces will inevitably alter relative 
positioning. The type III call centre example for 
instance, could become a type I as infrastructure 
further standardizes and greater automation of analysis 
reduces the performance complexity. 
2.2. Why buy complex performance? 
Although the strategic logic for the ‘make or buy’ 
(supply or buy) decision is normally efficiency 
maximization, a range of factors, such as global trade 
liberalisation, narrower definitions of core 
competencies and greater technological complexity 
(Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003) seem to be changing the 
scale and scope of outsourcing. Customers of firms like 
Flextronics (electronics sector) and Li and Fung 
(garment sector) for example, are no longer buying sub-
contract manufacturing capacity but rather procuring 
‘solutions’ to complex business problems. Although this 
suggests that buyers are seeking a broader range of 
strategic contributions from their suppliers, this 
appears to challenge the dominant theoretical, 
  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), logic for 
outsourcing. Assuming opportunism and bounded 
rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997) TCE asserts 
that firms attempt to minimize transaction costs by 
“assigning transactions (which differ in their 
attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive 
capacities and associated costs of which differ) in a 
discriminating way” (Williamson, 1985, p.18). As a 
result, firms only internalize activities where adverse 
costs might arise from operational difficulties in a 
market exchange, primarily uncertainty, frequency, and 
asset-specificity1. However where there are high levels 
of asset-specificity, TCE suggests that hierarchy 
becomes the least-cost governance solution2. In other 
words, this logic suggests that organizations 
would/should not procure complex performance or that a 
purely transaction-based logic is insufficient to 
understand the PCP phenomenon. In a related discussion3 
Holcomb and Hitt (2007) balance economizing arguments 
with a logic where “the complementarity of 
capabilities, strategic relatedness, relational 
capability-building mechanisms, and cooperative 
experience [are equally] important conditions….for 
strategic outsourcing”. Using this balanced definition 
it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 1: 
PCP arrangements are considered where organizations can 
rely on markets for specialized capabilities, able to 
                                               
1 An asset is transaction specific if its value in a transaction 
with another party is reduced and correspondingly, the larger the 
value ‘gap’ between its best and best-alternative use, the greater 
the specificity of the asset. 
2 Although governance through hierarchy necessitates high fixed set-
up costs, its use of authority rather than court enforced contract 
law (for market governance) provides greater control over specific 
capability investments (Masten, 1988). 
3 See also earlier work by Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Combs and 
Ketchen, 1999; Madhok, 2002; Jacobides and Winter, 2005 and Hoetker, 
2005. 
  
deliver complex performance, that supplement existing 
capabilities deployed along a firms value chain and 
create value beyond that achieved through cost 
economies. 
 
This notion of looking for strategic value from 
procurement is also evident in the public sector. Faced 
with increased pressure to be both more effective and 
efficient many governments have turned to the 
controversial magic formula of private sector 
involvement in the financing, development and provision 
of public services: effectively creating complex 
performance arrangement. Contractual arrangements such 
as the UK Government’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI4) 
for instance were explicitly conceived as mechanisms 
for ‘purchas[ing] quality services on a long-term basis 
so as to take advantage of private sector management 
skills incentivized by having private finance at risk’ 
(UK Stationery Office, 2000, p.8). Despite these 
similarities, the distinct nature of public sector PCP 
activity, introducing divergent values and strategies5 
to both contractual negotiations and subsequent 
performance management, necessitates consideration of 
several additional factors. For instance, although 
private-sector PCP arrangements become increasingly 
possible as markets for specialized capabilities emerge 
(Jacobides 2005), politically motivated public buyers 
can pre-empt established market provision. Some public 
sector ‘make-buy’ decisions for instance, might be more 
accurately described as choices between in-house 
                                               
4 Leaving aside specific (sometimes ideological) concerns, such as 
whether the policy is legitimate, cost-effective, actually results 
in risk transfer or is sufficiently accountable (e.g. Froud, 2003) 
this paper argues that PFI is still innovative public procurement 
practice. 
5 It has been argued that many of the UK Private Finance Initiative 
contracts have been influenced more by politics than economic 
rationality (Lonsdale, 2005a). 
  
provision6 and processes of encouraging (via development 
funding, etc.) one or two specialized private firms to 
develop/offer new services that the state can 
eventually buy! In the construction sector for example, 
it was arguably the emergence of public sector Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) infrastructure projects that 
created the ex-ante need for firms to develop their 
complex performance provision capabilities (Gann and 
Salter 2000). Similarly, Boeing, following an order in 
2006 from Air India for 68 aircraft (worth over $11 
billion - at 2006 list price!), also agreed to create a 
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility in 
Nagpur and further fund a number of existing Indian 
flying schools. Therefore it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 2: 
Public-Private PCP arrangements are considered where a 
public buyer is seeking (for a variety of policy 
motivations) to create/support markets for specialized 
capabilities that replace and/or supplement existing 
state provision and create value beyond that achieved 
through cost economies. 
 
3. The Process of PCP 
There will inevitably be multiple distinct governance 
challenges associated with the PCP process. For 
example, producers or systems integrators often face 
monopolistic markets, with highly politicised 
purchasing decisions, government regulators, 
sophisticated buyer/operators and long lead times in 
commissioning, design and production. It is only 
through the award of extended revenue generation 
opportunities that suppliers are encouraged to commit 
but, paradoxically, these multi-decade life cycles 
                                               
6 Noting that state service provision is often the result of market 
failure. 
  
introduce further uncertainty and complexity. This 
paper focuses on three areas of specific conceptual and 
practical concern:  
 
1. Contractual. How do you write, monitor and enforce 
contracts in situations of high asset specificity, 
high uncertainty and low exchange frequency, 
circumstances that would lead a TCE analysis to 
suggest hierarchy as the optimal governance 
solution? 
2. Relational. Trust, social ties, etc. are essential 
complements to contractual mechanisms but in 
complex PCP arrangements their development may be 
disproportionately time and resource consuming. 
3. Integration. Given the PCP intent is to replace, 
transfer and/or renew in-house capabilities, ex-
ante diagnosis of systems constraints and 
legacies, and ex-post integration activities are 
likely to be key ex-ante and ex-post challenges. 
 
As each area is explored in more detail, a number of 
further research proposition are identified. 
 
3.1. Contractual Governance 
‘Classical’ contract theory argues that parties 
safeguard against the hazard of opportunism by applying 
legal contracts, specifying what is acceptable and what 
is not, with threats of legal enforcement or non-legal 
retribution (Williamson, 1975). In theory, ‘complete’ 
contracts can be drafted (Lyons and Metha, 1997), that 
is contracts containing all the necessary safeguards to 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour and reduce 
transactional ambiguity by clear specification of what 
is and what is not allowed within a relationship (Lui 
and Ngo, 2004). For instance mitigating the risks 
associated with opportunistic behaviour by stipulating 
penalties that change the pay-off structure (Parkhe, 
  
1993). Following this logic, an optimal contract is the 
one with the lowest transaction costs relative to 
outcome. In practice however, drafting costs and 
asymmetric information render most contracts 
“incomplete”, only defining remedies for foreseeable 
contingencies and/or specifying processes for resolving 
unforeseeable outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, p.707). 
PCP arrangements introduce a number of additional 
conceptual and practical challenges for contractual 
governance, beyond those introduced by a very large 
number of technological and transactional variables, 
all multiplied by the uncertainties introduced by 
extended timeframes. Consider for example, the 
bilateral interdependence (Carney, 1998; Lonsdale, 
2005b; Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Leiringer, 2006) that 
is created by very significant levels of exchange-
specific investment (e.g. building a hospital for a 
public health authority). Although this mutuality (i.e. 
where else will the buyer obtain hospital services; 
what else will the supplier do with a hospital) could, 
in certain circumstances, reinforce inter-
organizational co-operation, from a contractual 
perspective it also clearly exposes both buyer and 
supplier to potential opportunism and therefore 
increases the likelihood that all parties (but 
especially public-sector buyers) will feel obliged to 
engage in a complicated and challenging contracting 
process. Additionally, as PCP processes are likely to 
“be both irregular and infrequent … [organizations] … 
may rely more intensely on suppliers and specialist 
external advisors.” (Flowers, 2007); this could 
potentially contribute to extreme contracting costs 
(Baiman and Rajan, 2002). Thus it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 3: 
  
The greater the complexity of the performance solution 
being procured, the greater the time and costs 
associated with the contracting process. 
 
In addition to being difficult and expensive, Holcomb 
and Hitt (2007) argue that such contracting is “often 
counter-productive”. After all, if PCP contracts are 
both incomplete (e.g. Lonsdale, 2005b; Bennett and 
Iossa, 2006) and excessively detailed, it is likely 
they will be inflexible and difficult to monitor ex-
post (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980). In other words, 
and paradoxically, although PCP exchange governance may 
be heavily reliant on contractual mechanisms, it may 
actually lack enforcement capabilities. As a result, it 
seems likely that these arrangements will be regularly 
opened up to various forms of external arbitration, 
including formal review by the local legal system 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1998). 
Following Agency Theory perspectives on information 
asymmetry between principal7 and agent8, effective PCP 
contractual governance needs to address both search 
costs and contract monitoring/enforcement costs. In 
other words, it depends upon accurate ex-ante 
specification of service requirements and establishing 
meaningful ex-post controls. So, for example, 
successful bidding for a typical PFI contract depends 
upon accurate operational forecasts (e.g. traffic 
volumes, patient numbers, etc.) and effective control 
is dependent upon ongoing capture of the same essential 
operating standards (Nisar, 2007). Whilst this may be 
straightforward for some applications (e.g. a toll 
road), research into the most complex PCP arrangements, 
like the UK National Air Traffic Service (NATS), has 
                                               
7 The buyer - responsible for designing and proposing the contract. 
8 The supplier – who will perform the task and must decide if 
interested in signing or not (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 
2001) 
  
highlighted this as the PCP challenge (Walder and 
Amenta, 2004). Others have proffered the complementary 
argument that effective governance in long-term supply 
relationships is linked to effective knowledge and 
information management over the whole lifecycle, based 
on reliable and consistent data. (El-Haram et al., 
2002; Brady et al., 2005; Schofield, 2004; Tranfield et 
al., 2005). Thus it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 4: 
The greater the complexity of the performance solution 
being procured, the more significant the ex-post 
contract monitoring costs (design and implementation of 
incentive structures, resource intensity, time 
commitment, etc.). 
 
Discussion of ex-post contract monitoring also raises 
the analogous question of how PCP contractual 
governance, normally devised for a single prime 
supplier, influences the rest of the supply chain. 
Given that many ‘integrated solutions’ are produced in 
multi-firm alliances, collaboration between parallel 
primes can seemingly be made to work but it is less 
clear to what extent other firms, especially small 
firms (SMEs), can operate under PCP contracting forms, 
given that their typical life-cycle will be shorter 
than an average PCP contracting period. Thus it is 
proposed that: 
 
Proposition 5: 
PCP arrangements will not be replicated by prime 
suppliers with their suppliers (in particular with 
smaller firms) in subsequent network tiers. 
 
3.2. Relational Governance 
Various studies have noted the complementary 
characteristics of contractual and relational 
  
mechanisms (Zucker, 1986; Larson, 1992; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005; Halldórsson 
and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006; Vandaele et al., 2007). 
Tranfield et al. (2005) for example argue for the 
significance of relationships in PCP governance, 
especially when co-ordinating intra- and inter-
organisational networks with a multiplicity of 
stakeholders. More generically, clearly articulated 
terms, remedies, and processes of dispute resolution in 
combination with relational norms of solidarity, 
bilateralism, and continuance may yield greater 
confidence to cooperate (Baker et al., 1994; Stephen 
and Coote, 2007). Similarly, social processes (e.g. 
trust) that promote norms of flexibility, solidarity 
and information exchange, can safeguard, albeit 
informally, against exchange hazards and facilitate the 
enforcement of obligations (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Gulati, 1995; Baker et al., 
2002) and unforeseeable contingencies may be 
accommodated by a bilateral approach to problem solving 
which facilitates adaptations – especially within a 
long-term relationship (Zand, 1972). Conversely, there 
are significant embedded difficulties associated with 
the effective application of relational mechanisms in 
PCP, especially public-private, relationships: power 
imbalance (Grimshaw et al., 2002); divergent values and 
strategies9 in contractual negotiations/performance 
management (Teisman and Klijn, 2004); inappropriate 
risk and benefit sharing (Dixon et al., 2005; Erridge 
and Greer, 2002). Moreover, continuity of staff is 
almost impossible in any multi-year contract – and 
individual relationships are a core component of inter-
organizational relational governance. Finally, if 
relational governance goes beyond calculative self-
                                               
9 It has consistently been argued that many of the UK Private 
Finance Initiative contracts have been influenced more by politics 
  
interest it can yield blind trust, which can be 
(rationally) exploited in competitive environments 
(Williamson, 1993). Thus it is proposed: 
 
Proposition 6: 
In PCP governance joint use of contractual and 
relational mechanisms generates more efficient outcomes 
than the use of either in isolation but contractual 
governance will tend to dominate. 
 
Some studies have explored the dynamic interaction 
between contractual/relational mechanisms (e.g. Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Olsen et al., 2005). For instance, 
given that a contract is often presented as a 
manifestation of power that can promote conflict (Gaski 
1984) and defensive behaviour (Zand, 1972), Koppenjan 
(2005) argued that early ‘interaction’ helps develop 
common understanding and mutual trust and thus 
positively impacts contract negotiation processes. 
Equally, relational governance strongly complements 
contractual processes when facilitating continuity in 
the face of changes and conflicts (Macneil 1978). Thus 
it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 7: 
The greater the complexity of the performance solution 
being procured, the greater the benefits to all PCP 
exchange parties from investments in relational 
governance during the contracting process. 
 
Conversely, Larson (1992) highlights that the 
development and maintenance of relational governance, 
including a network of social ties, may be time and 
resource consuming, especially with PCP arrangements 
where the scale and scope of exchange can be extremely 
                                                                                                                       
than economic rationality (Lonsdale, 2005a). 
  
significant and repeat business may be less likely 
(North, 1990). Thus it is proposed: 
 
Proposition 8: 
The risk of potentially significant sunk costs will 
prevent PCP exchange parties from investing in the 
development of relational governance before a contract 
has been signed 
 
3.3. Integration Governance 
Consider the transfer of an established infrastructure 
asset system, like the Chicago Skyway Toll Bridge, into 
a PCP arrangement. Long maintained by the City of 
Chicago's Department of Streets and Sanitation; in 
October 2004 the Skyway Concession Company (SCC10) was 
awarded a 99-year operating lease, making it 
responsible for all operating and maintenance costs and 
giving it the right to all toll and concession revenue. 
In other words, although future upgrades and 
maintenance costs were clearly part of the motivation 
for the outsourcing decision, the Chicago Skyway was 
primarily a ‘substitution-based’ procurement decision 
(Gilley and Rasheed, 2000) - one where the buyer sought 
to replace or transfer extant capabilities. 
Correspondingly SCC had to be cognisant, pre-bidding 
and pre-contract, of the “constraints defined by 
existing systems and the legacies of the technologies 
they embody” (Gann and Salter, 2000). Given that such 
system integration capabilities have been identified as 
key success factors in the integrated solutions market 
place (Brady et al., 2005, Davies et al., 2007), it is 
proposed that: 
 
Proposition 9: 
                                               
10 A joint-venture between the Australian Macquarie Infrastructure 
Group and the Spanish Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de 
Transporte S.A. 
  
The greater the complexity of the performance solution 
being ‘substituted’ through procurement, the more 
significant the technical systems integration challenge 
(i.e. time for pre-contractual appraisal, pre-transfer 
preparation and post-contractual systems migration). 
 
Moreover, integration is not just a question of 
appraising and connecting ‘hardware’ but significantly 
also requires active management of human resources. 
Most of the Skyway employees for example, found 
themselves switched from the public to private sector 
and, no matter how experienced the incoming service 
provider may be in contracting for this process (e.g. 
TUPE11 compliance) the ongoing management of employees 
requires considerable effort. Moreover, the business 
case for many PCP arrangements derives from anticipated 
cost-savings and the identification of these 
efficiencies is predicated on accessing detailed 
operational performance data. Some of this data capture 
can be automated (e.g. the Rolls-Royce Naval Total Care 
Package – a form of ‘power by the hour’ for Navy buyers 
– employs remote Engine Health Monitoring Systems as a 
core component of their management systems) but there 
will always be significant human input and as such 
performance monitoring will be influenced by the 
incentive structures that encourage individuals to 
complete forms, write reports, make timely calls, etc. 
Thus it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 10: 
The greater the transactional complexity of the 
performance solution being ‘substituted’ through 
                                               
11 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006 (TUPE) is the main piece of UK legislation 
governing the transfer of an undertaking (e.g. contracting out of a 
service) or part of one, to another organization. Designed to 
protect employees in a transfer situation enabling them to enjoy 
  
procurement, the more significant the employee 
integration challenge (i.e. time for pre-contractual 
appraisal, pre-transfer preparation and post-
contractual incentivization and management). 
 
In addition to ‘substitution-based’ models, a great 
deal of PCP can be classified as ‘abstention-based’ 
procurement (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000), where 
capabilities are bought rather than committing to the 
necessary in-house investments. Indeed, the benefits of 
long-term PCP are typically presented as those that 
derive from the synergy between designing, building and 
operating: seeking innovative solutions based on whole 
life-cycle costing (Ratcliffe, 2004). For instance, 
aligning the design and construction phase of an urban 
transport system project with the corresponding long-
term delivery phase may lead to cost-effective and 
innovative service improvements (e.g. with respect to 
environmental impact). Thus it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 11: 
The greater the infrastructural complexity (i.e. long 
duration contract integrating multiple design/operating 
phases) of the performance solution being procured, 
rather than developed in-house, the more significant 
the opportunity for supplier innovation. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically however, this same extended 
supplier commitment gives rise to the greater risk of 
moral hazard. Although a supplier may have delivered 
the additive capability and originally specified 
performance improvements, the buyer will remain 
concerned that they are not enjoying the most 
innovative, cost-effective and appropriate service if 
                                                                                                                       
continuity of terms and conditions, with continuity of employment. 
TUPE regulations comply with relevant EC Acquired Rights Directives. 
  
the long-term arrangements have – by definition - 
created an effective monopoly for the supplier? In many 
PFI/PPP markets for example, this concern over a lack 
of long-term flexibility (Dixon et al., 2005) and 
minimisation of alternative supply options has given 
rise to the inclusion of market benchmarking processes 
in the original contract; whereby key elements of the 
bidding process are re-enacted every few years (e.g. in 
the UK, every 5 years is typical) to ensure ‘fair 
competition’. Although an interesting mechanism, the 
same challenges of asset specificity and uncertainty – 
together with a declining long-term incentive - give 
rise to the enduring prospect of supplier lock-in. 
Moreover, ‘abstention-based’ procurement is likely, 
over time, to result in a greater capability gap 
between the buying organization and intermediate 
markets. Key suppliers of complex performance are able 
to combine the learning from previous projects with the 
learning from their established base, together with 
learning from previous bids and negotiations (Davies, 
2003). The experienced supplier therefore develops a 
breadth and depth of capabilities that it can apply to 
any individual transaction with a potential buyer and 
given the financial and organizational significance of 
a typical PCP arrangement, bidder reputation (based at 
least in part on PCP track record) may have a 
disproportionate impact on selection and contribute 
directly to supplier rent generation. In contrast, the 
buyer of a complex performance package tends only to 
maintain internal capabilities that relate to the use 
of existing or initially scoped systems, rather than 
the acquisition or development of a new system. For 
many buyers therefore, it is likely that over time 
their capabilities will relate mainly to older 
generations of technology rather than the new ones they 
may subsequently wish to acquire. Thus it is proposed 
that: 
  
 
Proposition 12: 
The greater the complexity of the performance solution 
being procured, rather than developed in-house, the 
more significant the risk that supplier-led innovation 
outside that specified in the contract will diminish 
over the lifetime of the contract. 
 
4. Empirical Research 
This is not an empirical paper. The concepts and 
specific propositions presented are however intended to 
provide a clear starting point for further theory-
driven empirical research (Melnyk and Handfield, 1998). 
The authors themselves for instance, have conducted a 
large-scale (100+ interviews, 6 supply networks) case 
based investigation of propositions 6 and 7 (Zheng et 
al. 2008 report preliminary findings from this 
project). Specifically the work seeks to explore the 
changing significance of contractual and relational 
governance over time in the long-term relationships 
between public buyers and private service providers. 
Although a longitudinal approach in its pure form (i.e. 
following the contract over 25 or 30 years) was 
impractical, retrospective data was collected using the 
respondent-driven critical incident technique. Critical 
incidents or events that had a positive or negative 
impact on the relationship that occurred during the 
different project phases (i.e. procurement/bidding, 
construction and operation phases) were mapped along a 
timeline. 
Further investigations should seek to challenge, test 
and modify this set of propositions that are inevitably 
‘work-in-progress’. The paper makes no specific 
recommendations for methodologies other than to 
encourage the widest possible range of methods, with 
the recognition that some of the propositions will 
probably be better suited to different approaches. An 
  
investigation of propositions 1 and 2 for example, 
requires researchers to understand the strategic PCP-
related motivations of a range of stakeholders who may 
not themselves recognise the phenomenon being 
addressed. This is likely to be best suited to 
exploratory case study work or possible a range of 
Delphi investigations. Conversely, proposition 3 could, 
with suitable refinement and operationalisation of the 
PCP matrix (probably via discrete Likert scales), be 
analysed with quantitative methods using either 
questionnaire data or secondary sources as an input. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper set out to investigate the integrated 
solution or complex performance phenomenon and then 
provide some initial conceptualization, via a set of 
twelve research propositions, of the distinct practical 
and conceptual procurement challenges it creates. The 
performance/infrastructural dimension of complexity 
presented in section 2 offered a simple definitional 
schema for clarifying what exactly is meant by PCP – 
noting that buying performance outcomes rather than 
acquiring resources and using them is not itself a 
novel phenomenon (e.g. leasing). The complexity model 
allowed us to focus on the distinct notion of PCP. It 
is clear from this preliminary exploration that any 
complex phenomenon will generate myriad issues of 
conceptual and practical interest and as a result the 
core of the paper was a more focused discussion of 
distinct governance challenges associated with PCP. 
Accepting this limitation, conclusions emerged in three 
principal areas. 
First, it is critical to set the PCP phenomenon in a 
broader economic and political context and highlight 
the central role of de-regulation/globalization and 
evolving public sector procurement in the emergence of 
the phenomenon. The work argues that a purely 
  
transaction-based logic is insufficient to understand 
why the phenomenon has emerged (e.g. Transaction Cost 
Economics would suggest that PCP is an inappropriate 
make v buy solution) and that PCP buying organizations 
are therefore motivated by a combination of cost 
economies and capabilities management. The more 
‘strategic’ or ‘(public) policy’ (i.e. long term, 
ambiguous, risk bearing) nature of this type of 
decision-making renders it more controversial, as 
particularly evident in the critiques of PPP/PFI. The 
paper also argues that although buyers may have 
distinct strategic motivations, public and private PCP 
can be, a priori, examined as a common process. 
Second, PCP arrangements introduce a number of specific 
challenges for contractual and relational governance. 
Complexity has the potential to render any contracting 
process both more expensive and more ‘incomplete’, 
opening up the intriguing possibility that although PCP 
exchange may be heavily reliant on contractual 
mechanisms, it may actually lack enforcement 
capabilities. As a result there will be significant 
benefits to all PCP parties from greater interaction 
but the potential risk of sunk costs determines the 
precise level of investment in the development of 
relational governance. 
Third, both ‘substitution-based’ but more significantly 
‘abstention-based’ PCP are likely, over time, to result 
in capability gaps emerging between buying 
organizations and their intermediate markets. The 
experienced supplier develops a breadth and depth of 
capabilities that it can apply to any individual 
transaction but the PCP buyer it is likely that, over 
time, capabilities will relate to older performance 
characteristics. 
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